With the forthcoming disposal-sale of the final share “package” of the TSS, at the National Bank, more or less completed as the full denationalization of the domestic banking system has been written many times to date. And you wonder, is that “good or bad”? And for “who” is good or bad? The answer to the question is essentially to the ‘position’ that one takes, to ‘what and who’ the banking system needs. And after taking a position on it, he can then easily answer for the “good” and the “bad” of the project. For example, with Greece’s entry into EMU and the circulation of the Euro, Greek banks were a strategic tool for the “exit” of Greek companies and the domestic economy in the Balkans, in the decade following the historical events of 1989 (not the “fall” of Andreas Papandreou, but the fall of the USSR). Then and despite the internal harsh political disputes that led even to unprecedented political events, such as the government of cooperation Mitsotakis – Floriki (1989), particularly since the mid-90s, especially the years that the twin Kostopoulos – Karatzas dominated, the banking system was the main carrier of the major exit to the Balkans. An “exit” that ended in vain, especially after 2008 – 2010. The names Kostopoulos – Karatzas were not mentioned by chance, which without being the largest shareholders (Karantzas was not even a “shareholder”), however they literally led the banking system with an overall strategy. These two bankers can easily claim that they incorporated in their personal presence and strategy the expectations of an excess for the domestic economy. An excess which then – with other protagonists – ended up in the biggest economic fiasco and the largest restructuring of state debt in the history of capitalism since World War II to date. They came, despite their normal rivalry, to venture even the merger of their two banks (Alpha and National), but “stumbled” last moment into forces and “blocks” that had already begun to question this possibility of domestic economy, both of which had envisioned for their time. In order to avoid misunderstanding, both of these bankers, beyond what was mentioned above, were “coupling” their hump and many interesting “grey” areas for which there are many stories to tell. But what one cannot blame is that they lacked the strategy and vision for the economy. Of course it is not the purpose of this note to make an evaluative report of the banking system of the 90s and 00s, when everything was played. But it is worth asking who, with what strategy and with which shareholders “determine” the fates of the domestic banking system (or whatever is left of it) and the economy today, after the fall of debt restructuring. We will insist on “with what strategy” as the economy as a whole, still under the balance of its memorandum obligations (let us not forget that within the next few years the repayment of the 25 billion euro deferred interest is pending), is obliged to calculate how and with what aim it will cooperate with the banking system. For example, today the largest shareholder in systemic banks is Mr. Paulson if we are not mistaken. A man who is the key to raising resources for Mr. Trump’s election campaign… So who defines his fortunes that systemic banks will “work” in the economy? Can they work on the basis of a strategy that expresses their interests will at the same time be integrated into an overall strategy for the economy, such as the decades of Karatzas and Kostopoulos? One cannot say that the existing heads of the four systemic banks suffer from a lack of capacity. On the contrary. They have already provided practical evidence in the process of disengaging their banks from the EFSI. But that is not the point. The question as it was then is whether they can work together with the economy in a single strategy. And conditions today are much more complex than ever. We must not forget that today the banking system and the economy as a whole are obliged to “work” in an environment of withdrawal of liquidity from the ECB , in an environment of unprecedented political, economic and geopolitical uncertainty. But that is why systemic banks cannot “work” with different strategies than those of the economy as a whole. But this needs the Karatzades and Kostopoulos of today. Are there? If so, they should do something to convince the economy, beyond his concern to compensate their foreign shareholders…
Are there “Karajades” and “Kostoles” in banks today?
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