To what will 2025 differ for Greece (economics) from 2024

The Greek economy, as everyone knows, has a key – structural feature that is a dual-face problem: a major permanent deficit in the current account and very low productivity. In 2024 because of the tourism and partner of the substantial activation of the Recovery Fund (both the loan and the grant) he managed to “cover” and overcome this problem. Indeed, in a way that the final result gives a growth rate of the highest in the EU. This was possible for two reasons both have to do essentially with the external environment in which the domestic economy, namely the Eurozone, works. For tourism, numbers are known. Even if the apparent “disturbing” in the financial and geopolitical system do not exceed some “limits”, these numbers can be repeated a little bit above, a little below. 2024 was also a year when the inputs from the Recovery Fund for investments covered and exceeded the almost permanent “investment gap” in the country’s economy for years. But just because capital inputs come from this source, it was not possible to change anything substantial at the levels of productivity of economic activity as a whole for the economy. TTE’s data show that Greece continues beyond the purchasing power of wages to be in the last positions on the list of productivity improvement rates… In 2025 it has not so far shown any new condition for changing this reality. Change that creates expectations for improvement in the productivity front in the domestic economy. The only positive expectation is the “absorption” of the resources of the Recovery Fund (TA) which are an important part of the formation of GDP for the country. If all goes well then a 5% of GDP will come from the TA in 2025. Of course, in the fine letters of the information we have on the absorption of the resources of the TA we read that the absorption of resources is not identical to their disposal (disbursement) in the projects and programmes for which they have been committed. This part of the TT fund path is greatly delayed. As funds they temporarily strengthen the liquidity reserve – the notorious ‘coup’ – with which debt is relieved through selective and extremely vulnerable are true, active debt management movements, while improving its image both as a percentage of GDP and as a service cost. But this must not be forgotten that it is because of the dramatic consequences of the three monuments… This “roadway” of TA funds, from Brussels and Luxembourg to Athens, can be said that although it is “delaying” to reach final recipients, it is in this way double “usable” to maintain liquidity in the banking system, but also to serve debt… This, although extremely useful, does not accelerate economic activity in a way that improves, either the balance sheet deficit, or investment support for the effort to increase the productivity of the economy. What can be changed in this “identity” in 2025? Many and important. First of all, the return of Trump to the White House launches twists on one hand to the economic and partner in the geopolitical landscape internationally together with the Eurozone. Either one, or the other, or the combination of the two can cause multiple causes and grounds, for major and widespread consequences on the financial markets and on the foreign exchange markets, after they ‘turb’ the financial system. The reason is one and the basic: the uncontrolled and bottomless well of American public debt which is served solely thanks to international savings and securing dollar capital flows on the American capital markets. The service mechanism of this debt acts as a feeder for the financial markets and the financial system. Any turmoil in this “process” by Trump policies, is launching consequences on a globalised – despite the problems – system in which the eurozone and the euro, under the present circumstances, constitute the “Achilleian heel”. In other words, major changes or even reversals in 2025 for the domestic economy are inevitable functions of direct reversals in the international and European environment. Changes that cannot be restrained or controlled at country level by the security safeguards that have activated either the three memoranda, nor the straitjacket of the updated Stability Pact, as well as both determining factors for the domestic economy, the balance of current transactions and tourism deficit are directly exogenous. The Recovery Fund remains for 2025 and 2026 (which closes) to save what can be saved if the international storm breaks out.