The ‘Group of Six’ to Appear at EU Summit on Feb 12 – Athens’ Position?

A recent note in Oikoklastika highlighted that amid global turbulence, the so-called ‘United Europe’ is seeking its next steps not through deeper integration, but by deepening internal fragmentation—embracing ‘multi-speed’ governance. The catalyst for this shift was the recent virtual meeting of the ‘Group of Six’, ahead of the EU summit on February 12. This informal coalition—comprising the Eurozone’s strongest economies (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain)—has reportedly prioritized forming an ad hoc cooperation framework across three key areas: foreign policy, defense financing, and establishing a central hub for the European capital market—in essence, money and arms. Its stated rationale is that the EU’s current decision-making, requiring unanimity and veto rights, renders it sluggish and ineffective in crises. Yet history shows such issue-based groupings have long existed within the EU—from economic to migration policy—without undermining its 27-member cohesion. The Eurozone and Eurogroup themselves are extreme examples of internal flexibility. This system endured as long as external conditions allowed—especially sustained U.S. cooperation under the post-WWII and post-1989 order. Trump’s policy, however, marks a rupture: openly questioning the EU’s legitimacy and utility. In response, the Group of Six emerges not as a continuation of past choices, but as a strategic survival mechanism. Its unofficial debut at the February 12 summit reflects this new reality. Still, this core-of-the-strong approach does not signal the end of the EU’s necessity—evident in Berlin’s stark divergence from Paris over the Mercosur deal, or shifting bilateral alliances like Berlin-Rome.