The first dramatic seconds after the train crash, where two huge trains occurred and Intercity 62 cars are wrapped in flames, are described in the draft finding to investigate the tragedy in the , which brings to the public today Wednesday (5.2.25) the daily newspaper “Daily”. In the preliminary draft of the finding resulting from the investigation of the Tempe railway accident under the National Aviation and Railway Accidents and Transport Safety Organisation (EODASAM) outlines the incidents that preceded the collision of the two trains, the mechanism of conflict itself, as well as the causes of the ensuing explosions. CORVERSE According to the preliminary draft of the finding, there is no data to support the existence of a tank of tens of tons or the existence of a hidden wagon on the commercial train, but it seems that by the end of the final result the estimate for a quantity of 3,5-4 tonnes, probably aromatic hydrocarbons, will be documented in the third commercial car, which was ignited after the collision. The small leakage of silicone oils contained by transformers in the first two wagons of the commercial train is reportedly not capable of causing the explosion. This is also reinforced by the fact that transformers have suffered only a few cracks. The recomposition of the sequence of events is based on the known traffic data of trains (direction, speed, mass, analysis of the type of vehicle damage after the accident), while for explosions material from the cameras was used primarily, however considered capable of leading to scientifically safe conclusions about the type of freight of the commercial train moving on a descent line. CORVERSE According to the findings, none of the research centres involved – the Universities of Pisa and Ghent or the Swedish Institute – have definitively ruled on the type of cargo that led to the explosion. However, all three of them have documented the most appropriate methodology, from which safe conclusions can be drawn, taking into account correct parameters (water, wind speed, temperature, etc.). It is the method of “Computative Fluid Dynamics – CFD”, which analyzes the flame and results in the species and extent of the flammable material that has caused it. In particular, the University of Pisa has given a positive opinion on the suitability of using the method in analysing the explosion in the Tembes accident. The University of Ghent has at present validated the definition of correct parameters (e.g. humidity) to perform the check using the CFD methodology. Especially for silicone oils, Ghent researchers rushed to remove them early from the frame of responsibilities, just thanks to CFD. While the finding is to be presented in full at the end of February, the method of carrying out the explosions highlighted by the authors of the finding as the most appropriate, has not yet yielded definitive results, while, according to information from “Daily”, “runs” at the moment, as time is needed to analyse all data . kathimerini.gr Fire From Intercity 62 , fully damaged by fire is the back of the restaurant wagon and passenger car B2. Just six fractions of a second after the collision of the locomotives of the trains are observed the first electric arc to create short circuit and bright glow, while two more flashes follow. The explosion begins about three fractions of a second later from the ground and possibly due to the sparks from the brakes, according to the finding. The explosion expands upwards, forming a fire about 42 meters diameter burning for about 2 seconds, marking the first phase of the fire. In the second phase, a few seconds after the initial ignition there is a new fire in a “undefined volume or area” away from the original fire. However, the original fire is fueled, which doubles in size before extinguishing seconds after ignition, according to the finding. The duration of this second phase and the height of the fire columns indicate that a significant amount of fuel is involved , based on what is mentioned. In phase three, two separate fires continue to burn at ground level, one near the commercial train engines, which probably heats up silicone oils. It is created there a hearth that erases itself before consuming all the oil in the transformer. Another fire burns in the remains of the restaurant’s wagon with a strong flame and a total duration of 2 hours. These two fires seem to consume every remaining fuel that has not been consumed by the original fire. The first firefighting attempt took place 43 minutes after the fire started by a single fire vehicle, managing to affect it minimally. The fire in passenger wagon B2 began from the bottom at 23:35 and then burned its entire length “without any active firefighting until it started burning with very intense flames, powered by the fabrics of large seats, curtains and interior materials” , according to the finding. By 00.40 the fire had burned the entire wagon. B2 and had begun to extinguish itself, as there was no other fuel material. It is not until after 02:00 the dawn that the fire in the restaurant car seems to be appeased, as aerial photography from the accident site shows smoke coming out of the remains of the restaurant’s wagon and two other small hobs remaining on the front and rear of the wagon. An attempt to extinguish recorded at 02:32 shows foam drawn towards the wagon, without being clear whether it played a role in the actual extinguishing of the fire that had already devoured the total length of the wagon, says the finding. Three phases The analysis of the optical material at the time of the collision also indicates the sequence of three successive but distinct phases (first collision, second collision, deceleration) from the moment of the first frontal collision to the moment each vehicle is immobilised in its final position. The first phase mainly concerns the first four carriages of the two trains: the two of the commercial where the engines were located and the first two of the passengers where the engine and first passenger seat were located. The initial impact is frontal and results in the wagons being ejected to one side and crashed into the highway wall. The first-class car was completely destroyed, with the seats dispersing in the wider area of the accident. As the total four first carriages of the two trains are disconnected from their trains, the remaining wagons are now moving slower due to impact, but also the activation of the brakes. The finding shows that the manual emergency brake is activated 1 second before the first, frontal, collision and that the mechanical brakes are automatically activated on the passenger train due to loss of air pressure from the 1st impact. Front is the second collision of the remaining wagons, the passenger train restaurant that is its third wagon, and the wagon of the commercial carrying steel plates. This is the conflict that causes serious damage to the restaurant wagon which takes the form of “final sigma”. In the third phase of the collision, wagons continue to collide with slightly smaller momentum, according to the finding. The finding identifies serious deficiencies in CIUs and RAs At the same time, the draft of the EDASAAM finding identifies serious deficiencies in OSE and RAS. In particular, deficiencies or omissions are identified in the structure and organisation of the stations, such as the Larisa at issue, where the VHF table and telecommunications station are located in different directions, preventing each person responsible from supervising at the same time contacting other officials, but also with regard to staffing. With regard to its use the wireless communication mode is considered ineffective due to the existence of static noise and interference and the inability to respond to “secret points” – in the tunnels the wireless “does not work”. According to “Daily”, after the accident signal amplifiers and cameras were installed in the tunnels, but measures are not considered sufficient. The finding shows the use of a GSMR digital system as an optimal solution. Its installation, however, was scheduled for last December, but has not yet been completed. At the same time, the protocol used is deemed obsolete, and according to the finding evidence that it was not fully followed. As regards the staffing of the OSE, it is characteristic that in the internal documents of the organisation the recruitment of 290 persons in permanent posts was foreseen for the first half of 2021. However, only 119 people were approved for recruitment in the autumn of 2021 and only in January 2023 began their evaluation to be launched. In 2022 the OSE administration decided to recruit more than 200 people, including 70 station chiefs, who took office in January 2023. Meanwhile, OSE had hired contractors with 6 months contracts, which at the end of 2024 numbered around 400. According to the findings, the OSE is currently operating with 45% of the potential originally envisaged in its organisation chart. More detailed: The OSE should have 2,184 employees , of which 412 station managers and 255 key holders. In September 2024 he had 589 employees, of which 108 stationmasters and 57 keymen. Similarly, in December 2023 it had 645 staff, of which 117 stationmasters and 64 keymen, and in December 2022 had a total staff of 735 persons, of whom 133 stationmasters and 64 key holders. Improvements to the functioning of the Railway Regulatory Authority showing existing deficiencies, such as the incident reporting system and strengthening its supervisory role, are proposed in the finding. A typical example of timeless distortions in the issues of the Greek railway is the operation of EDASAAM itself, which was predicted in January 2023, but remained a shell until autumn 2023. Delays resulted in no representative of his at the scene of the accident, but the investigation being done through visual material and evidence of the case, while to this day his work strikes bureaucratic obstacles.
Tempy: The Apocalypse for Explosions After Train Conflict
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