“The negotiation and so-called ‘soft waters’ with it cannot be an end in itself. On the other hand, the country becomes a hostage to Ankara’s arbitrary tactics,” the former Prime Minister notes, in his speech Monday (20.01.2020) in the presentation of the professor’s book, former Deputy Foreign Minister, Giannis Valinakis, entitled “For a new strategy towards Turkey”. Speaking at the event about the book by Professor Giannis Valinakis, in which the former Prime Minister, Antonis, is present Samaras, Costas Karamanlis notes that “Turkey sees the reluctance of the US and the European Union to intervene forcefully in the region. And these Ankara estimates do not only concern our country. Turkey is invading and interfering everywhere in our neighbourhood. A strong witness to Turkey’s intentions is its involvement in developments in Syria,” the former Prime Minister stressed. CORVERSE Leaving spikes for foreign policy pursued Kostas Karamanlis argues that “as long as Greece does not react or react with fear, Turkey widens its demands.” “Unfortunately, Turkey has managed to inject us with the dilemma of retreats or war. In this way he seeks – and in some cases manages – to make profits without falling a bullet,” he explains and adds with meaning: “Initiations, however, and mobility do not constitute retreats to our vital interests and unilateral rights, which are also enshrined in International Law, such as the expansion of our territorial waters. The novel theory that, unless we offer serious exchange from our unilateral rights in Turkey, she will have no reason to negotiate with us is unprecedented in international chronicles.” ADVERSE “Questions that International Law calls on us to negotiate, such as the AEZs, and which should, as all the countries of the world do, come with the maximum of our claims, do not constitute initiatives in advance concessions. And, indeed, without consideration,” he clearly points out. In conclusion, Costas Karamanlis calls for a new “holistic” strategy towards Turkey, with the ultimate aim of halting and canceling its revised and hegemonic strategy, as emerges from the doctrine of the “Blue Country”. Especially for the Thrace – Aegean – Cyprus axis, which is the bastion of Hellenism and which the Blue Fatherland attempts to parabolize. The international scene, foreign policy, is tough and all states are trying to maximize their benefits. That is exactly what Greece should do. One does not need to be pessimistic to find that the horizon on the international stage is heavily clouded. Kostas Karamanlis’s speech in the presentation of the book by Professor and former Deputy Foreign Minister, Giannis Valiniakis: “YA NEW STRATEGIC AENANTI IN TURKEY” “It is with great pleasure that we take in our hands the new book of Giannis Valinakis. A rare combination of features is found in the author’s face. The deep, for over forty years, knowledge of international relations and foreign policy at academic level, with the direct experience of handling these complex issues as government officials for five and a half years. Valenakis neither theorizes, as an institutionally distant commentator of developments, nor reacts as they test it and according to the needs, communicative or actual, as a politician of the series. Using this great comparative advantage with ease, the coupling of historical and international political knowledge with its personal involvement in the real politics, it deposits a rare value view of Greek-Turkish relations. This is essentially an extremely interesting proposal for a new “holistic” strategy vis-à-vis Turkey, with the ultimate aim of halting and canceling its revised and hegemonic strategy, as emerges from the doctrine of the “Blue Country”. The great advantage of this proposal is that it is not theoretical, but clearly practical and concrete. Clearly, the book is the result of thorough research and consideration of all data. This result also results from tried tactics in the field, diplomatic and negotiating technique, but also a painful search for ideas and proposals. It thus manages to offer a guide, a real strategy towards Turkey. Overall and detailed, visionary and ambitious goals, but also realistic. Even if no one agrees with all their approaches. At the same time, it offers a vision for Greece of the future, in the context of the emerging geopolitical upheavals and developments, using all its potential and advantages, especially as an energy hub. This book also offers another service. It is an eloquent response to those who speak of “the school of stillness”. To those who call inaction and avoidance of initiatives, pure patriotism, the defence of the country’s rights and interests and the unrelenting attitude towards Turkey’s absurd and illegal demands. But even to those who call all this picturesque. Initiatives, however, and mobility do not constitute retreats to our vital interests and unilateral rights, which are also enshrined in International Law, such as the expansion of our territorial waters. The novel theory that, if we do not offer serious exchange from our unilateral rights in Turkey, she will have no reason to negotiate with us is unprecedented in international times. Negotiation is not an end in itself. And those who propose as a profit from such a negotiation to avoid war should know that retreats on such issues do not buy peace. Instead, the country becomes a hostage of Turkey’s arbitrary tactics and opens its appetite for more illegal claims. But also on issues that International Law calls on us to negotiate, such as the AEZ, and which should, as all the countries of the world do, come to the maximum of our claims, are not initiatives in advance concessions. And, in fact, no exchange. Unfortunately, Turkey has managed to instill the dilemma of retreats or war. In this way he seeks – and in some cases manages – to make profits without falling a bullet. As long as Greece does not react or react with fear, Turkey is expanding its demands. I’ve said that before, I’m not questioning anyone’s patriotism. But some in Greece, well-intentioned, I will say, in a good mood, essentially repeat Turkey’s arguments. It is a school of thought that tells us to understand Turkey’s ‘reasonable’ concerns as well. We are told that Turkey also has rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. And that Turkey reacts with challenges, because we make it feel surrounded. But the Aegean is devastated by Greek islands! Geography is what imposes the continuity of Greek space! No one has excluded Turkey from the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean and no one has denied its rights in these areas. Those rights, of course, arising from international law, from treaties, from geography itself! Another argument is that we show maximumism. That we want to exhaust what is provided for in the Convention on the Law of the Sea without a spirit of compromise. But, of course, as shown in the book, in every negotiation you go with the maximum of what is provided for in International Law! The international scene, foreign policy, is tough and all states are trying to maximize their benefits. That is exactly what Greece should do. But also the theory that, as time goes on, our position is deteriorating or that we do not use the little we could have with the expectation of many is also innovative. These issues are vital to our country and the benefits or effects of their outcome will accompany Greece in the perennial. It is not a solution to undermine them in the long term, to gain any benefit now. It is said, in fact, that time works against us, that as long as we do not solve one, Turkey constantly adds new claims. But the package of Turkish claims was and is single. It can unfold gradually, but the targeting was and is always the same. And that is the goal that the vision of the Blue Country that encodes Turkey’s timeless claims describes. Therefore, there would be no fewer claims if we compromised and stopped them somewhere in time. On the contrary, we need a long-term strategy, in the footsteps of what is described in the book presented today, in order to intercept Turkey’s aspirations at some point and to reap the greatest possible benefits from negotiation for our country. Some people are talking about co-exploitation. But co-exploitation where? All over the Aegean? Or co-exploitation, since it will all be clearly defined under International Law, where and only where our limits may coincide, if and when required by the findings, and based on the respective percentages? But the issue in general is different. It is how we read Turkey. Because how we read Turkey is what it will dictate and how we should respond to the challenges posed by Ankara’s practices. And here I believe that some people, both within and outside Greece, are misreading Turkey. Because the problem is not whether we will make this or that concession, him or that compromise, in order to finally achieve peace and cooperation between the two countries. Turkey’s proper reading, the obvious, the self-evident, is that it is a country that revises, as is detailed in the book. Turkey tells us in a thousand ways. He keeps telling us. That what she is interested in is changing the regime in the region. To correct the “injustices” she considers to have become historically at her expense. It is a country, basic, timeless, goal of which is the hegemony in the region. But now she has dressed her permanent pursuits with a theoretical cloak, the one of the Blue Fatherland which from now on will also be taught to the new generation of Turkey in schools. The Blue Country tells us for itself what Turkey is seeking. We don’t have to go too far. Let’s just look at the map of the Blue Country and understand. The reason why Turkey has been escalating its efforts over the last few years is because it believes that the international environment is now in favour of it. It sounds odd, but an eloquent example of the dangerous turn that is now taking place is that it has even opened a debate on re-charging the U.S. border by integrating Greenland and Canada. Moreover, the international environment has become more multi-polar, gives greater scope for action to regional actors, while at the same time Turkey sees the reluctance of the US and the European Union to intervene forcefully in the region. Turkey invades and intervenes everywhere in our neighbourhood. A strong witness to Turkey’s intentions is its involvement in the developments in Syria. It is outrageous that Ankara itself admitted that these developments were launched in response to the refusal of the previous Syrian regime to co-decide its country’s future with Turkey. And this is precisely indicative of how Turkey sees its role and its future in the region. Reviewing and hegemonic, i.e. changing the existing order of things and retaining a leading role for itself, with neighbouring satellite states or – at best – states that will co-decide with Turkey what Ankara considers to be their internal issues. Turkey’s involvement in Libya shows the same. With its own intervention, the balance in favour of one party of the warring parties was tilted, resulting in Tripoli now dependent on Turkey, which led, as we know, to the completely absurd and illegal Turkish-Libyan Memorandum. Ankara also operates in the same way in terms of the Aegean, Thrace and Cyprus, where it requires to co-decide with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Especially for the Thrace – Aegean – Cyprus axis, which is the bastion of Hellenism and which the Blue Fatherland attempts to parabolize, the book makes specific proposals. Measures for Thrace developmental and demographic aid, but also to eliminate the dangerous Turkish influence. Measures to develop and strengthen economic activity for the Aegean islands and also to return to them their permanent inhabitants or descendants. And defence support for Cyprus, but also a solution to the Cyprus problem that will not make it a hostage of Turkey and the Trojan horse of Ankara in the European Union. Special mention is made of the fact that the great success of 2004 was the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union rather than the accession of Cyprus to the Annan Plan which would make it dependent on Turkey. And therefore the possibility for Cyprus to make use of its accession to strengthen its geopolitical position and a better solution to the Cyprus problem. Valenakis rightly explains that those who repeat that Ankara is threatening us for internal consumption are not reading Turkey correctly and that he also wants that peace and stability. It is this complacency that recommends inaction in foreign policy. Because underestimating the very real threat leads to the illusion that, with dialogue with Ankara, the creation of a climate of confidence and some concessions, we will avoid tensions or even war. However, false dialogue and retreats or war are not a one-way street. A comprehensive, demanding strategy, to defend the Greek interests and to derive the greatest possible profit from negotiation. With the simultaneous strengthening of Greece’s position both geopolitically and with long-term, consistent and serious planning of military deterrence and defence shielding. And here I would like to highlight some points concerning the tactics proposed by Valenakis. The first concerns dialogue with Turkey. It explains in detail that the demonization of the defence of our interests and the profit gain from negotiation has been attempted. And we risk being dragged into a dialogue, without our own pursuits and without our own agenda. Focused solely on warding off the absurd and illegal Turkish agenda, we are constantly in a position to defend ourselves. At the same time, he points out that the so-called ‘soft waters’ cannot be an end in itself, as they will not have duration, since they are not accompanied by our appropriate strategy to tackle Turkish looks. That is why we must take advantage of the so-called ‘soft waters’ in order to implement a strategy for halting Turkish aggression, calling in this direction exchange from Turkey through the European Union and the US and, at the same time, strengthening our military deterrence. The second point I would like to highlight is the proposals in the book to exploit our alliances. A dialogue that focuses exclusively on the bilateral level and does not make use of our position in the European Union and our relations with the US clearly leads to the abandonment of our great advantage and works for Turkey’s benefit. On the other hand, it is vital that the threat that Turkey clearly poses to our territorial integrity, as it is constantly expressed by itself, and also with casus belli, is constantly highlighted. In this light, and any accession of Turkey to the defence structures of the European Union is unthinkable. The seriousness of the threat we face is measured by partners and allies and by our own determination and should be highlighted by us, in an absolute and without the complex that we are supposed to be the ‘annoying’ partner. The last point I would like to emphasise is the importance of our defensive shield that is analyzed in the book. This should not depend on at times and without foundation optimistic considerations for the course of Greek-Turkish relations. Unfortunately, Turkey is and will be a difficult neighbour. And, for Greece, the need for deterrence is unnegotiable, as is the need for readiness even for the most unthinkable scenario, that of conflict. And, of course, there is absolutely no reason to demilitarize our islands. On the contrary, it is stressed that any scenarios of complacency “train” and Greek society to underestimate the threat and consider equipment and military service as an unnecessary burden. And this is a luxury that Greece does not have. There is also reference in the book to a number of iconic initiatives undertaken by our government. Overturning the doctrine of stillness on the issue of EEZ until a solution was found with Turkey, and qualifying for the immediate negotiation of setting EEZ with all our neighbours, leaving Turkey for the end. Moreover, by defining as the object of the negotiation the wider concept of AEZ in relation to the hitherto restrictive concept exclusively of the continental shelf, as was the case with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. These boundaries would bring Greece very close to the goal of obtaining an AEZ four times greater than the current territorial area of Greece, and would put pressure on Turkey. By 2009, we were already measuring an AEZ delimitation agreement with Albania, with full implementation of the rules of International Law, and we were very close to an agreement with Libya. At the same time, efforts have been made within the European Union to recognise a European EEZ and jointly mobilise the coastguards of the Mediterranean Member States in the event of crises in their EEZs. In this direction, the “Television Group” which had been created with a Greek initiative, namely the group of Mediterranean Member States coordinating their efforts in matters of common interest within the European Union, was also assisted. Another link, as Valentinakis says, in this chain of our plan against Turkey was the exclusively Greek initiative to create FRONTEX. The then migratory crisis was used to make it clear to our European partners that the Greek southeast borders are European borders. On this occasion, the creation of the European Coast Guard was also launched to guard these borders. The next link was the effort that led to the introduction of Article 42.7 in the Treaty of Lisbon, with the mutual defence clause against external threats. And, also, consultations on the installation of a French naval base in Leros, with the aim of French warships patrolling the area to guard the Greek, and thus European, borders. These initiatives and many others are witnessing a “motility” in the right direction, the direction of a claim strategy to defend Greek rights and interests. One does not need to be pessimistic to find that the horizon on the international stage is heavily clouded. Conflicts and instability tend to become the rule in international life. Blood wars are breaking out more and more often, even on European soil. The inviolability of borders no longer exists. Border changes from inconceivables become a step – step issue of realistic debate. Action on violence is being treated in an increasingly acceptable manner. In the multi-polar world emerging, the constants we have known for many decades no longer apply. Middle players find room to raise claims, territorial or other, at the expense of other states. International law is in retreat and the UN is weaker than ever. The European Union is a semi-paralyst, with a clear deficit of leadership, strategy and will, and is at risk even its political and social destabilization. It is in this unfavorable landscape that the country is called upon to defend its interests and claim its rights. Against a neighbor who is systematically and methodically trying to overthrow the existing regime, as provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne, the Law of the Sea or other international agreements, to impose his sovereign role in the wider region and who does not hesitate to threaten and sometimes resort to the use of violence. It’s not just my anxiety for the future. Similar views are expressed by former President of the Republic of Prokopis Pavlopoulos, former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, the leading Greek diplomacy Ambassadors Petros Molyviatis and many others from all political or academic spectrum. In this difficult world, the challenging and dangerous world, we are called upon to preserve our homeland and Hellenism, our territorial integrity, our country’s interests in the wider region, to effectively prevent aggressive attitudes of others and to ensure a better future in the generations of Greeks coming. To achieve this, we must put aside the mercies, micropolitics, discord and find the power to put together our best self. With vision, strategy and unity”.
Karamanlis for Greek-Turkish: Peace is not bought by retreats – Negotiation is not an end in itself
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in Policy