The 2025 Annual Report by the IINE (Institute of Labour of GSEE) highlights a critical transformation in the Greek economy: the divergence between growth rates and the distribution of its benefits. In 2024, GDP increased by 2.3%, primarily driven by private consumption and investments. Between 2019 and 2023, while real disposable household income rose by €8.3 billion and consumption by €7.9 billion, real wage growth was limited to just €130 million. In contrast, wealth income increased by €4.5 billion and business activity by €2.6 billion.
Meanwhile, consumption among salaried workers remained stagnant, while for households with at least one employer member it nearly doubled. This shift in wealth accumulation toward higher-income groups makes it clear that labor is not adequately valued within the development model. Within this context, economic policy must go beyond macroeconomic balance and ensure institutional protection of labor as a pillar of productive stability and social equilibrium.
**Productivity Without Wage Justice**
The relationship between productivity and wages continues to weaken, revealing a critical inconsistency within Greece’s production system. From 2019 to 2024, real labor productivity increased by 1.2%, yet average real hourly wages fell by 4.7%. Among the eleven main economic sectors, productivity rose in eight, but wages increased in only two. In 2024, corporate profits accounted for 50.2% of GDP, compared to 41% in the European Union—indicating a systemic redistribution of surplus at labor’s expense.
This trend is also reflected in inflation drivers. In Greece, GDP deflator increases are mainly attributed to expanding corporate profit margins, followed by import costs, with wage costs playing a minor role. As a result, the purchasing power of salaried workers continues to erode: 57.1% say they cannot make ends meet, and nearly one in three cannot allocate even a small amount for personal use. Severe material and social deprivation affects 8.8% of the population, far exceeding the EU average of 3.8%.
Thus, it becomes evident that improving productivity alone does not constitute progress unless accompanied by redistribution and institutional reinforcement of wage labor.
**Investment Dependency and Productive Deficit**
Greek economic investment in 2024 was marked by external dependence and limited structural efficiency. Although investments increased in absolute terms, 26% were covered through subsidies, mainly from the Recovery Fund—the highest rate among EU countries. This heavy reliance raises concerns about the sustainability of investment activity over the medium term and businesses’ ability to implement investments using their own resources.
Moreover, investment allocation indicates a persistent focus on construction and real estate at the expense of manufacturing and technology-intensive sectors. The result is a continued productive deficit. In 2024, the current account deficit reached -6.4% of GDP, largely due to increased demand for imported intermediate goods. Greece struggles to substitute imports of medium- and high-tech content, confirming the low integration of domestic production into global value chains.
Out of 21 major product categories, only four show a positive net export balance—and from these, only two belong to manufacturing. The economy moves within an environment of growing extroversion without corresponding strengthening of internal production capabilities. Without technological upgrading and a shift in investment direction, the productive deficit will continue undermining macroeconomic balance and social cohesion.
**Employment Inequalities and Internal Weakening**
The increase in employment in Greece in 2024—with a 63.3% employment rate for ages 15–64 and unemployment dropping to 10.1%—is recorded as a positive development. However, this improvement comes with persistent qualitative inequalities. Greece remains second to last in the EU regarding overall employment rates, maintaining the second-largest gap between men and women and the third-largest between younger and older age groups.
Even more telling is the fact that Greece records the lowest employment rate for tertiary education graduates (80.3%), indicating low absorption of skills and an inability to connect with sufficiently specialized job positions.
**Toward a Programmatic Re-positioning of Labor**
The data from the IINE 2025 Annual Report paint a picture of stabilization without empowerment. The Greek economy shows superficial macroeconomic balance but maintains deep structural weaknesses significantly tied to the decline in labor’s share. Within this context, positioning labor as one of the central pillars of the development plan is not only a matter of social justice but a prerequisite for the overall strategy’s sustainability.
Raising the minimum wage must be decoupled from subsidy-based logic and reconnected with living wage standards and collective bargaining. Restoring collective agreements and negotiations is absolutely necessary. At the same time, public policy must support investments with high technological and social multipliers, strengthen public infrastructure in care, training, and regional development, and prioritize job quality as a resource allocation criterion.
Labor cannot remain a passive recipient of developments. It must regain institutional presence, political weight, and strategic centrality. Without a programmatic restructuring of labor, no development path can be considered sustainable or fair.