Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis has sent a clear message to Ankara: Turkey’s threat of war against Greece cannot be treated as an internal political matter—and it cannot be sidelined in European discussions on defence cooperation. His remarks came just hours after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed the casus belli—a 1995 Turkish parliamentary resolution declaring that any Greek extension of territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 nautical miles would constitute grounds for war—is no longer a concern for Turkish society.
A firm stance on EU defence access
Responding to a question from skai.gr, Gerapetritis made it unequivocal: so long as Turkey keeps the casus belli in force, Greece will veto Ankara’s participation in the EU’s Security and Defence Equipment (SAFE) initiative—and in every other European defence programme. In effect, as long as the threat of war remains, there is no European ‘passport’ for Turkey’s defence industry.
“Either you withdraw it—or you don’t”
The minister directly countered Erdoğan’s attempt to downplay the casus belli as irrelevant to public opinion. “The casus belli isn’t measured by public satisfaction polls. Either you fully withdraw it—or you don’t,” Gerapetritis stated, underscoring that threats of violence cannot be left on standby, activated at will.
Athens’ position is straightforward: a country cannot simultaneously threaten an EU member state with war while seeking access to European defence tools. Nor can the casus belli remain active in the Aegean while Ankara receives EU defence funding as if nothing were amiss.
Greece’s veto power
Gerapetritis emphasized that Greece will raise the issue at every relevant European forum for as long as the 1995 Turkish parliamentary decision remains legally valid. “As long as there is a threat of war against Greece, our country will raise the issue—and block Turkey’s entry into SAFE and every other EU defence programme,” he stressed.
This message is directed at multiple audiences: to Ankara, that the casus belli carries tangible diplomatic and strategic costs; to Brussels, that European defence cannot be built on compromises over sovereignty; and to those who believe Turkey could quietly enter EU defence initiatives through the back door—that Athens holds the key.
Necessary—but not sufficient
Yet Gerapetritis also added a second layer of clarity: “As long as the current Greek government is in office, no discussion on Turkey’s participation in EU defence initiatives will begin until this condition is met. The removal of the casus belli is a necessary precondition—but not a sufficient one. Other conditions must also be fulfilled.”
In other words, even if Ankara formally revokes the casus belli, automatic entry into EU defence programmes is off the table. Greece insists on setting the framework, defining terms, and establishing prerequisites—including the principle that European defence must not reward revisionist behaviour.